Short-termism review part 2

Mark Kleinman at Sky looks like he's been well briefed on the contents, get a load of this. Some of the questions on his list look suspiciously detailed (unless he spends as much time thinking about this stuff as I do!) so check out the the full list below for hints about what we can expect tomorrow. Note questions on rem committee membership and 'relationship between directors’ pay and employees’ pay' (ie ratios):

1. Does the legal framework sufficiently allow the boards of listed companies to access full and up-to-date information on the beneficial ownership of company shares?
2 What are the implications of the changing nature of UK share ownership for corporate governance and equity markets?
3. Is there sufficient dialogue within investment firms between managers with different functions (i.e. corporate governance and investment teams)?
4. How important is voting as a form of engagement? What are the benefits and costs of institutional shareholders and fund managers disclosing publically how they have voted?
5. What action, if any, should be taken to encourage a long-term focus in UK equity investment decisions? What are the benefits and costs of possible actions to encourage longer holding periods?
6. What would be the benefits and costs of more transparency in the role of fund managers, their mandates and their pay?
7. What would be the effect of widening the membership of the remuneration committee on directors’ remuneration?
8. Are shareholders effective in holding companies to account over pay? Are there further areas of pay, e.g. golden parachutes, it would be beneficial to subject to shareholder approval?
9. What would be impact of greater transparency of directors’ pay in respect of: linkage between pay and meeting corporate objectives; performance criteria for annual bonus schemes; relationship between directors’ pay and employees’ pay?
10. Do boards understand the long-term implications of takeovers, and communicate the long-term implications of bids effectively?
11. Should the shareholders of an acquiring company in all cases be invited to vote on takeover bids, and what would be the benefits and costs of this?