1. Isn't it bit odd that some shareholders push for the legislation of rights to bring about changes that they can't achieve alone? Just thinking about the demans for a say on pay (vote on companies' remuneration policy/report), this is desired because it would presumably enable them to rein in execessive pay. But, since in most cases such votes are advisory, what extra power does it give shareholders, shouldn't their ownership enable them to do this without a vote? And in any case the right only has power if shareholders are willing to use it. Would it not be easier for shareholders to demand legislation to directly address problems with pay, rather than the rights which may not be used or be effective?
2. A mate at a fund management company I met recently implied that some companies in which they invest are overmanned and that the crisis ought to see a bit of thinning out. It only struck me afterwards (given that I basically view active management as a giant swindle) what a mad perspective this is in my understanding of the world. (ie people who are paid lots of money to cream money off your pension think you should be out of a job).
3. This and this are interesting.
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