When people stand to make money if they are right, the rate of conformity is significantly decreased if the task is easy. People are less willing follow group members when they stand to profit from a correct answer. But there is a striking difference when the experiments are changed to make the underlying task difficult. In that event, a financial incentive for correct answers actually increases conformity. When the question is hard, people are more willing to follow the crowd if they stand to profit from a correct answer.It's just a snippet, and there are plenty of other bits in the books that give pointers to how people can, and do, overcome the pressure to conform. Nonetheless it does seem to provide grounds for another argument against the merits of performance-related pay. Unless we think running a company is a simple task. And maybe it tells us something about benchmark-hugging in the investment world too.
PS. As I thought the book lends a bit of weight to my argument that it would be better if more investors went public with their concerns.